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The Relationship Between an Alternative Form of
Cognitive Reflection Test and Intertemporal Choice
Jiuqing Cheng, Cassidy Janssen
Department of Psychology, University of Northern Iowa, United States

The cognitive reflection test (CRT) has been popular because it has demonstrated a good
predictive validity of a variety of biases in judgment and decision making. Thomson and
Oppenheimer (2016) further developed a second version of the cognitive reflection test, CRT2. Although CRT-2 has been found to be associated with several biases in judgment and decision
making, its relationship with intertemporal choice remains unclear. Previous studies have shown
that intertemporal choice characterizes the competition between intuition and reflection, and
can be predicted by the original CRT. To further validate CRT-2, the present study tests the
relationship between CRT-2 and intertemporal choice. The study finds that better performance
on CRT-2 is significantly associated with fewer impulsive intertemporal choices in both gain and
payment conditions. Moreover, impulsive choices are related to intuitive errors but not nonintuitive errors generated from CRT-2. The study suggests that CRT-2 provides some more
items for researchers to select to cha racterize individual differences in think ing style and
judgment and decision making.
Key words: cognitive reflection, CRT-2, intertemporal choice, dual-process theory

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a
popular test that is used to measure rational
thinking and normative choice preference
(Frederick, 2005). CRT contains three items, and
an iconic item is the famous bat and ball problem: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs
$1.00 more than the ball. How much does the
ball cost?” As one can imagine, a “10 cents”
answer appears to be intuitive but nevertheless incorrect. To find the correct answer, the
respondent needs to override the intuitive impulse, and perform reasoning deliberately
(Frederick, 2005; Kahneman, 2011).
Researchers believe that the CRT responses
characterize the interaction between two com-

peting mental processes as defined by the dualprocess theory (Frederick, 2005; Kahneman,
2011; Sinayev & Peters, 2016). According to this
theory, two processes (systems) exist in our
mind: whereas System 1 is fast, intuitive and
impulsive; System 2 is slow, deliberative and
controlled (Sloman, 1996; Evans, 2008;
Kahneman, 2011). To deliver a correct answer
on a CRT item, System 2 needs to check, inhibit,
and outperform System 1.
The dual-process theory has long been used
to address biased judgment and decision-making, and a variety of such biases are linked to
System 1’s impulse and intuition (Evans, 2008;
Kahneman, 2011). Consistently, a series of studies have revealed an association between CRT
and biased judgment and decision-making. For
example, in the intertemporal choice task, participants with lower CRT scores displayed a
stronger preference for the immediate smaller
rewards than for the later larger rewards and
hence, were more impulsive in their choices
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(Bialek & Sawicki, 2018; Frederick, 2005; Sinayev
& Peters, 2016). In the gamble choice task, participants with lower CRT scores exhibited excessive risk-averse, hence they were not able
to maximize the potential earning (Frederick,
2005). Additionally, fewer correct answers on
CRT were associated with greater conjunction
fallacy and base-rate neglect (Hoppe &
Kusterer, 2011; Oechssle et al., 2009). Not surprisingly, performance on CRT also correlated
with scholastic assessment test (SAT, a popular test used for college admission in the United
States) scores and grade point average (GPA, a
classical measure to index overall academic performance), both of which require logical reasoning and deliberation (Frederick, 2005;
Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016).
Thus far, the development of CRT has advanced our understanding of judgment and
decision making; nonetheless, some concerns
have also been raised. For example, Primi,
Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati, and Hamilton (2016)
argued that CRT might be too difficult and hence
lead to a floor effect particularly in relatively
poorly educated populations.
A more significant concern deals with CRT’s
overexposure. As CRT gains its popularity in
research and media report, participants may
learn the items and the answers before taking
the test. For instance, in Thomson and
Oppenheimer (2016, study 1), more than sixty
percent of the participants had been exposed
to at least one item before the study. The knowledge of the test can artificially inflate the score.
In line with this, in Haigh (2016), those who had
seen at least one item scored significantly higher
than those without any prior knowledge of CRT.
Similarly, Białek and Pennycook (2017) analyzed
six previously published studies and found that
in four studies participants with prior knowledge of CRT obtained a higher score than those
who did not have such knowledge.
However, it is worth noting that although prior
knowledge of CRT may increase test scores,
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CRT’s predictive ability (its core ability) remains
robust. For example, in Białek and Pennycook
(2017), even though participants with prior
knowledge of CRT scored better, there was no
significant difference in CRT’s predictive ability (correlations between CRT and other tasks)
between experienced and inexperienced participants. Meyer, Zhou, and Frederick (2018)
tracked mTurk workers who took CRT repeatedly and found that on average, scores improved by merely 0.024 items per exposure.
More importantly, CRT’s predictions did not
significantly vary with repeated exposure. In
Stagnaro, Pennycook, and Rand (2018), CRT
was correlated with religious belief measures,
and such correlations were stable across years.
Importantly, one recent study provided new
insights into the impact of CRT’s exposure on
its predictive power. Šrol (2018) found that this
impact was moderated by the need for cognition. In this study, CRT’s predictive ability of
performance on heuristics and bias tasks was
improved by its exposure only in those with a
high level of need for cognition. However, in
that sample, only 16% of participants were categorized into the group with a high level of need
for cognition. Thus, when combining all participants together, there was no overall difference in CRT’s predictions between exposed and
unexposed participants. Nonetheless, Šrol
(2018) indicated that participants’ metacognitive
characteristics might moderate how exposure
affected CRT’s prediction.
Another concern pertains to the confounding effect of numeracy. Sinayev & Peters (2016)
proposed and empirically demonstrated that
both cognitive reflection and numeracy were
needed to generate correct answers for CRT.
Numeracy refers to the ability to comprehend
and utilize numerical information (Peters &
Bjalkebring, 2015; Sinayev & Peters, 2016). According to Sinayev and Peters (2016), to generate a correct answer, participants went through
two steps. In the first step, participants needed
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to inhibit the intuitive impulse (i.e., cognitive
reflection). In the second step, participants engaged in math calculation (i.e., numeracy involvement). Consistent with their hypothesis,
Sinayev and Peters (2016) found that the
numeracy component, teased apart from the CRT
response, could significantly predict judgment
and decision-making biases as described
above. Thus, the relationship between CRT and
judgment and decision-making biases was confounded with numeracy.
Given the concerns, some researchers have
introduced modified CRT measures (Baron,
Scott, Fincher, & Metz, 2015; Primi et al., 2016;
Sirota & Juanchich, 2018; Thomson &
Oppenheimer, 2016; Toplak, West, & Stanovich,
2014). For example, to mitigate the potential floor
effect, Primi et al. (2016) added three new items
and found only a very small proportion of participants answered all items incorrectly. The new
version performed well in younger and less educated populations. To address the overexposure problem, Toplak et al. (2014) added four
more items to CRT. Sirota and Juanchich (2018)
further tested this seven-item version with three
formats: open-ended questions, two-option
multiple choices, and four-option multiple
choices. Both studies found that the extended
CRT retained its predictive power, regardless of
the question format.
Exploring a Second Version of CRT: CRT-2
Among the modified CRT measures, the
present study specifically focuses on CRT-2,
which was developed by Thomson and
Oppenheimer (2016). We have two reasons.
First, compared to the measures that contained
both original CRT and new items (Baron et al.,
2015; Primi et al., 2016; Sirota & Juanchich, 2018;
Toplak et al., 2014), CRT-2 adopts a completely
new set of items (specific items are found in the
Methods section). Our main goal is to further
validate these items by testing the relationship

between CRT-2 and intertemporal choice. More
broadly speaking, the study aims to further investigate whether CRT-type trick questions can
predict biased judgment and decision making.
CRT-2 has the potential to provide more items
for researchers to select to characterize individual differences in cognition.
Another reason to focus on CRT-2 is that CRT2 might rely less on (though not exclude)
numeracy. First, CRT-2 adopts items that aim to
reduce such an effect. As can be seen in the
Methods section, among the four items, the first
and the third items do not appear to need any
computation. Second, in Thomson and
Oppenheimer (2016), the correlation between
CRT-2 and numeracy was significantly weaker
than the correlation between the original CRT
and numeracy. Third, as demonstrated in Primi
et al. (2016), numeracy was a significant
covariate that mediated the gender effect on
CRT. That is, the fact that males had better performance on CRT was in part because males
performed better on numeracy. In Thomson and
Oppenheimer (2016), males scored higher on
both CRT and numeracy than did females. However, there was no difference in performance
between females and males on CRT-2. Taken
together, it is reasonable to believe that CRT-2
might rely less on numeracy than does the original CRT.
In Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016), CRT-2
was correlated with need for cognition, base
rate neglect, college GPA, and SAT scores, indicating it could replicate some of the important findings generated by the original CRT.
Nevertheless, the study did not find a significant relationship between CRT-2 and intertemporal choice. As described in that article, one
reason might be that the intertemporal choice
task was not reliable in the study. The low reliability might be because there were only a few
items. Moreover, only one relationship reached
a statistical significance level when testing the
correlation between CRT-2 and each of the
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intertemporal choice items separately. We note
that with the limited number of items, the task
might not be able to capture a stable choice
preference.
In the present study, we are interested in clarifying the relationship between CRT-2 and
intertemporal choice for two reasons. First,
intertemporal choice is related to a series of important life activities and consequences. For
example, research has found that more impulsive intertemporal choices are associated with
lower income, lower credit score, lower college
GPA, and a greater chance of having obesity
and abusing substances (de Wit, 2008; Kirby,
Winston, & Santiesteban 2005; Meier &
Sprenger, 2011; Reimers, Maylor, Stewart, &
Chater, 2009; Schiff et al., 2016). Thus, it is of
interest to examine a test that can characterize
individual differences in intertemporal choice.
Second and more importantly, researchers
have demonstrated that making intertemporal
choices reflects the competition between System 1 and System 2 as defined by the dual-process theory. For example, McClure, Laibson,
Loewenstein, and Cohen (2004) identified two
competing brain regions (part of the limbic system vs. dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex) when
participants were making different selections in
an intertemporal choice task. These two brain
regions resembled the characteristics of System 1 and System 2 (e.g., intuition vs. calculation). Additionally, with modeling, Price, Higgs,
Maw and Lee (2016) found that intertemporal
choice could be well explained by a two-parameter model that depicted the dual-process theory.
Moreover, recent studies with mouse-tracking
demonstrated that the trajectories were less direct when making less impulsive intertemporal
choices, and concluded that participants had
to inhibit the temptation of choosing the sooner
smaller rewards in order to maximize their benefit in the long run (Cheng & González-Vallejo,
2017; Dshemuchadse, Scherbaum, & Goschke,
2013; Stillman, Medvedev, & Ferguson, 2017).
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Therefore, testing the relationship between
intertemporal choice and CRT-2 helps to illustrate whether CRT-2 captures cognitive reflection (System 1 vs. System 2), as does the original CRT.
Overview of the Present Study
CRT-2 appears to provide some new items that
pertain to cognitive reflection and judgment and
decision making. Some recent studies combined
CRT and CRT-2 and had used the new composite to address honesty, analytical thinking style,
and attitude toward fake news (Capraro &
Peltola, 2018; Pennycook & Rand, 2017; Yilmaz
& Saribay, 2017). However, we believe the validity of CRT-2 needs to be addressed before its
extensive application.
The present study aims to test the validity of
CRT-2 by examining its correlation with intertemporal choice. To address the reliability issue, we employed an intertemporal choice task
that was recently employed in other studies
(Cheng & González-Vallejo, 2016; Dai &
Busemeyer, 2014; Scholten, Read, & Sanborn,
2014). In this task, participants make repeated
choices between a sooner, smaller reinforcer and
a later, larger reinforcer. With a series of choice
pairs, we hope to increase the reliability of the
task and to obtain a stable choice preference
from participants.
Furthermore, for CRT scoring, most studies
so far have used the number of correct responses. Such a scoring method measures cognitive reflection and has demonstrated good
predictive ability (Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler,
& Fugelsang, 2015). However, as implied in
Pennycook et al. (2015), while greater cognitive
reflection may predict more long-term oriented
choices, the pattern is different from the concept that intuition can predict more impulsive
choices. In other words, for CRT-2, even its correct response could predict intertemporal choice
preference, the extent to which CRT-2 measures

90

Studia Psychologica, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2019, 86-98

intuition in intertemporal choice remains unclear. From the perspective of face validity, if
CRT-2 taps into intuitive thinking style, two
patterns should be revealed. First, among the
errors, there should be at least a portion of intuitive errors. Too few intuitive errors among all
errors would indicate that CRT-2 is unable to
capture the intuitive thinking style. Second, the
intuitive error should be able to predict intertemporal choice preference in the opposite direction predicted by the correct response. Following Pennycook et al. (2015) and Sinayev and
Peters (2016), we employ the scoring method
with the correct response, intuitive error and
other error. For CRT-2, the intuitive and other
types of errors can be found in the Methods
section. The study aims to further examine
whether the performance of CRT-2 is consistent with its face validity regarding both reflective and intuitive thinking styles.
One issue of CRT-2 is its relatively low reliability (Cronbach’s α). In Thomson and
Oppenheimer (2016), with the same group of
participants, CRT-2’s reliability was .51, lower
than CRT’s reliability (.62). In Primi et al. (2016),
CRT’s reliability was .65. Białek and Pennycook
(2017) reviewed six past studies on CRT and
found that the reliability ranged from .53 to .76.
In Šrol (2018), CRT’s reliability was as high as
.78. Thus, it appears that for the original CRT,
its reliability varies across samples. For CRT-2,
it is not clear whether its reliability also varies
between studies. More importantly, consistently low reliability would reduce the merit of
CRT-2. Thus, the present study tests CRT-2’s
reliability with a different sample.
It is worth noting that in the majority of studies with intertemporal choice, only the gain condition is adopted. That is, participants make
selections between two rewards. In such a condition, excessive preference for the immediate/
sooner, smaller rewards over the later, larger rewards is considered being impulsive, and lower
CRT scores are supposed to be associated with

greater impulsive choices. To obtain a reliable
relationship between CRT-2 and intertemporal
choice, the present study also employs a payment condition where participants make selections between a sooner, smaller payment and a
later, larger payment. In this condition, excessive preference for the later, larger payment over
the sooner, smaller payment is regarded as the
impulsive choice pattern, because participants
have to pay more money in the long run (Cheng,
Lu, Han, & González-Vallejo, 2012; Perry &
Carroll, 2008). We hypothesize that lower CRT2 scores and more intuitive errors are correlated
with more impulsive choices in both gain and
payment conditions.
Methods
Participants
Prior to data collection, this study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB)
to ensure it met the ethical guidelines. In the
present study, all participants were recruited
from the participant pool at the authors’ institution. The participant pool was comprised of
freshmen and sophomore students who were
taking Elementary Psychology. Data collection
stopped at the end of the semester when the
participant pool was closed. As a result, onehundred and forty-five college students participated in this study via Qualtrics to receive
course credit. Three participants completed
fewer than half of the items. Another three completed zero or only one item on CRT. Hence
these six participants were removed from the
study. In the remaining 139 participants, there
were 68 females, 67 males and four did not reveal their gender. We note that this sample size
was comparable to the one tested in Thomson
and Oppenheimer (2016).
Sensitivity analysis was performed with
G*Power 3.1.9 to estimate the effect sizes with
the current sample size. α was set at .05 and
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statistical power was set at .80. As a result, the
study had sufficient power to detect a correlation coefficient of .23 (two-tailed), and differences between two independent means of d =
0.49 (two-tailed, one group had 68 females and
the other group had 67 males).
Materials and Procedures
All participants completed CRT-2 and two
conditions of intertemporal choice tasks (gains
vs. payments), as described below.
CRT-2 scale. Four items of CRT-2 were
adopted from Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016,
p. 101). To clarify the impact of intuitive error
on decision preference, we adopted two kinds
of scoring criteria (Sinayev & Peters, 2015;
Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). The first one
simply differentiated the incorrect and correct
answers. The second kind not only identified
the correct and incorrect answers, but it also
teased apart the errors into two categories: intuitive errors and other errors. The items and
the scoring keys are listed below. For each item,
any answer that is different from the correct or
intuitive answer is considered as a non-intuitive incorrect answer.
1. If you’re running a race and you pass the
person in second place, what place are you in?
(intuitive answer: first; correct answer: second)
2. A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died.
How many are left? (intuitive answer: 7; correct
answer: 8)
3. Emily’s father has three daughters. The first
two are named April and May. What is the third
daughter’s name? (intuitive answer: June; correct answer: Emily)
4. How many cubic feet of dirt are there in a
hole that is 3’ deep x 3’ wide x 3’ long? (intuitive
answer: 27; correct answer: none)
Intertemporal choice tasks. The intertemporal choice task employed in the present study
was similar to those reported in some previous
studies (Cheng & González-Vallejo, 2016;
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Scholten et al., 2014). The current study employed two conditions of intertemporal choice
tasks with hypothetical gains and payments. In
the gain condition, participants were asked to
make forty choices between a sooner gain and
a more delayed gain. All attributes, including
magnitude and delay, varied across all choice
pairs. To mimic the earning and payment (for
the payment condition) in everyday life where
whole numbers rarely occur, in all choice pairs,
the magnitude contained two decimal places.
As an example, participants were asked to make
a choice between $137.55 in 67 days vs. $90.29
in 34 days, and then moved to another choice
pair: $205.05 in 55 days vs. $149.85 in 32 days.
Across all choices, the averages of the sooner
and later delays were 28.68 and 54.43 days, respectively. The averages of the smaller and
larger gains were $195.97 and $345.75, respectively.
The delays and magnitudes used in the payment condition were exactly the same as those
used in the gain condition. There were two differences between the conditions. First, in the
payment condition, participants were asked to
make choices between a sooner smaller payment and a more delayed larger payment (as
opposed to selecting between gains in the gain
condition). Second, the sequences of the choice
pairs were different between the two conditions.
Doing so aimed to reduce the memory effect so
that memory of choices in one condition would
not affect choices in the other. In an earlier experiment performed by the authors, upon completing the task, participants were asked whether
they noticed that the attributes were the same
between the two conditions. None reported affirmatively.
Following previous studies (Cheng et al.,
2012; Scholten et al., 2014), the present study
employed the proportion of choosing the longterm advantageous options (later larger gain in
the gain condition, and sooner smaller payment
in the payment condition) to index the choice
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preference. A higher proportion in both conditions indicates a less short-sighted (impulsive)
choice preference.
Results

were .93 (95% CI between .91 and .95) and .92
(95% CI between .89 and .93), respectively.
Thus, choice preference in the current study
was reliable and could be used for further analyses.

Reliability of the Measures
In the current study, when only differentiating correct and incorrect answers, CRT-2’s
Cronbach’s α was .60, with a 95% confidence
interval between .48 and .70. When differentiating correct answers, intuitive errors and other
errors, CRT-2’s Cronbach’s α slightly increased
to .61, with a 95% of confidence interval between .50 and .71. Given the confidence intervals, such reliability was comparable to the findings in other studies of CRT-2 (Thomson &
Oppenheimer, 2016; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2017).
For the gain and the payment conditions of
the intertemporal choice task, the Cronbach’s α

Performance of CRT-2
On average, participants answered 2.39 items
correctly (59.8% correct rate), with an SD of
1.17. As seen in Figure 1, the percentages of
participants who gave zero to four correct answers were: 9.4, 12.2, 24.5, 38.1 and 15.8, respectively. Thus, based on the current sample, the
distribution of CRT-2 scores was not severely
skewed. Moreover, CRT-2 did not meet a floor
or ceiling effect. Table 1 further presents the
results regarding CRT-2 performance when differentiating intuitive and non-intuitive errors.
As can be seen, when participants made errors,
the majority errors (73.6%) were intuitive ones.

Figure 1 Percentage of different scores on CRT-2.
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Table 1 CRT-2 performance when differentiating intuitive and other errors
Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Non-intuitive error (%)
2.9
2.2
3.6
Intuitive error (%)
30.2
20.1
22.3
Correct answer (%)
66.9
77.7
74.1

Table 2 Pearson correlations between CRT-2 items
Item 1
Item 2
Item 1
-.28**
Item 2
-Item 3
Note. ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

As displayed in Table 1, the last item was
more difficult than the other three. Given the
different levels of difficulty, one might ask
whether including the last item decreased the
reliability of CRT-2. This was not the case in the
present study, as removing the last item resulted
in a Cronbach’s α of .60 (95% CI between .46
and .70). Moreover, as shown in Table 2, items
displayed significant inter-correlations, with the
only exception between Item 2 and Item 4.1 Thus,
all four items should be included in CRT-2.
CRT-2 and Intertemporal Choice
In the gain condition, the mean proportion of
choosing the later larger gain over the sooner
smaller gain was 0.64 (SD = 0.25). In the payment condition, the mean proportion of choosing the sooner smaller payment over later larger
payment was 0.67 (SD = 0.22). Similar to other
studies (Cheng et al., 2012; Estle et al., 2006),

1

For all correlations in the present study (Tables 2
and 3), there was little difference in correlation coefficients between when using Pearson correlation
and Spearman correlation. The significance of the
correlations remained the same when using either
type of the correlation.

Item 3
.35***
.35***
--
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Item 4
33.8
46.0
20.1

Item 4
.24**
.10
.30***

there was a trend that participants selected more
long-term advantageous options in the payment
condition than in the gain condition, t(138) =
1.64, p = .10, d = 0.14, although not statistically
significant.
Table 3 shows Pearson correlations between
CRT-2 responses and preference of intertemporal choice. As shown, overall CRT-2 performance and intuitive error were significantly related to choice preference in both of the gain
and payment conditions. Following Lee and
Preacher (2013), Fisher’s z test was applied to
examine whether the correlation strength was
significantly different between when using
CRT-2 total score and when using intuitive error to predict choice preference. In the gain condition, there was no significant difference between the two correlations, Fisher’s z = 1.25,
p(two-tailed) = .212. A similar non-significant
pattern was also found in the payment condition, Fisher’s z = 1.05, p(two-tailed) = .295. Thus,
CRT-2 total score and intuitive error had a similar predictive ability on choice preference in
both gain and payment conditions.
Contrary to CRT-2 total score and intuitive
error, error due to non-intuitive reasons was not
associated with choice preference in either condition. The non-intuitive error was not related
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to the intuitive error, either. We did not apply
Fisher’s z test to compare the predictive ability
between intuitive error and other error because
the latter one simply could not predict choice
preference.

no difference in any of the CRT responses between females and males. Additionally, there was
no gender effect on intertemporal choice preference.
Discussion

Gender Effect
Table 4 exhibits the comparisons on CRT-2
and choice preference between female and male
participants (those who did not report gender
were excluded in this section). Similar to
Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016), there was

The present study examined the relationship
between CRT-2 and intertemporal choice. The
overall performance on CRT-2 (e.g., average total score and inter-correlations between items)
was comparable between the present study and
Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016). Primi et al.

Table 3 Pearson Correlations between CRT-2 responses and preference of intertemporal choice
CRT correct
Intuitive
Other error Proportion of
Proportion of
rate
error
LL
SS
CRT correct rate
--.83***
-.42***
.29**
.31***
Intuitive error
--.16
-.23**
-.26**
Other error
--.15
-.12
Proportion of LL
-.56***
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
CRT correct rate: number of correct items out of 4.
Intuitive error: proportion of intuitive errors (out of 4).
Other error: proportion of other errors (out of 4).
Proportion of LL: the proportion of choosing the later larger gain in the gain condition.
Proportion of SS: the proportion of choosing the sooner smaller payment in the payment condition.

Table 4 Gender effect on CRT-2 and choice preference
Item
Females Mean (SD)
Males Mean (SD)
CRT-2 Item 1
0.69 (0.47)
0.66 (0.48)
CRT-2 Item 2
0.74 (0.44)
0.81 (0.40)
CRT-2 Item 3
0.74 (0.44)
0.75 (0.44)
CRT-2 Item 4
0.16 (0.37)
0.24 (0.43)
CRT correct rate
0.58 (0.27)
0.61 (0.32)
Intuitive error
0.31 (0.26)
0.28 (0.29)
Other error
0.11 (0.13)
0.10 (0.20)
Proportion of LL
0.63 (0.24)
0.65 (0.25)
Proportion of SS
0.70 (0.19)
0.65 (0.24)

t-test (df = 133)
t = 0.42, p = .672, d = 0.07
t = -0.97, p = .333, d = 0.17
t = -0.14, p = .885, d = 0.02
t = -1.12, p = .267, d = 0.19
t = -0.62, p = .540, d = 0.11
t = 0.62, p = .537, d = 0.11
t = 0.08, p = .941, d = 0.01
t = -0.29, p = .776, d = 0.05
t = 1.36, p = .176, d = 0.24
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(2016) concerned a potential floor effect for the
original CRT. As illustrated in Figure 1, less than
10% of participants answered all items of CRT2 incorrectly. Meanwhile, 15.8% of participants
answered all items of CRT-2 correctly. Hence,
the study did not detect any obvious floor or
ceiling effect, indicating the CRT-2’s difficulty
appeared to be appropriate for college students.
Compared to Thomson and Oppenheimer
(2016) and Yilmaz and Saribay (2017), the internal consistency of CRT-2 in the present study
was similar (when taking 95% confidence internal into account). As stated, at the apparent
level, the first and the third item in CRT-2 did
not need any computation, whereas the other
two items were more related to mathematics.
Thus, the inconsistency between the items’ relationship with mathematics might decrease
CRT-2’s internal consistency. While a
Cronbach’s α of .60 was far from being perfect,
it was still close to CRT’s Cronbach’s α in some
studies as cited earlier. Hence, we believe CRT2’s internal consistency should not be a fundamental problem that prevents its future usage.
The present study computed three scores:
CRT-2’s total score (i.e., the correct answer rate),
the percentage of intuitive errors, and the percentage of other errors. Similar to Thomson and
Oppenheimer (2016), the majority of errors were
intuitive errors. Moreover, there was no significant relationship between intuitive errors and
other errors. Thus, intuitive errors and other
errors appeared to capture different constructs
of thinking style.
Most importantly, the present study employed a reliable intertemporal choice task and
found that more CRT-2 corrected responses were
significantly related to fewer impulsive intertemporal choices in both gain and payment conditions. Additionally, we also found that intuitive errors but not other errors were significantly
positively related to impulsive choice preference. Furthermore, the strength of the correlation between choice preference and CRT-2 cor-
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rect responses was similar to the strength of
the correlation between choice preference and
intuitive errors. The similar predictive ability
between the correct responses and intuitive
errors might be due to the fact that the intuitive
errors accounted for 73.6% of total errors.
The findings stated above had a few implications. First, in addition to the correct responses,
intuitive errors could also predict impulsive preference in intertemporal choices. By contrast,
non-intuitive errors were not able to do so. While
we admit that both CRT-2 and intertemporal
choice tap into a variety of psychological constructs such as general intelligence and
numeracy, we believe the current findings generated by CRT-2 are at least consistent with the
notion of cognitive reflection and intuitive thinking style. In other words, the performance of
CRT-2 was in line with its face validity. To more
clearly demonstrate that CRT-2 can capture cognitive reflection and intuition, in future studies,
more CRT-type scales, thinking style scales (for
example, the Faith in Intuition scale used in
Pennycook et al., 2015), and judgment and decision making tasks are needed for cross-validation. Additionally, the study implied that for
CRT and other similar scales, to examine their
validity, researchers can go beyond the total
score (i.e., the number of correct responses).
The percentage of intuitive errors and the relationship between intuitive errors and other behavioral tasks should also be tested.
Combined with previous findings in Thomson
and Oppenheimer (2016), the present study implied that CRT-2 could provide some more valid
items for researchers to characterize individual
differences. In a broader sense, the present
study suggested that in addition to the three
original CRT items, CRT-type questions generally have good predictive power of biased judgment and decision making.
Limitations of the present study should also
be addressed. First, we did not directly ask participants whether they had seen any of the CRT-
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2 items before. Thus, we could not illustrate to
what extent CRT-2 was free of prior experience.
Second, Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016)
found that compared to CRT, CRT-2’s correlation with objective numeracy scales was weaker.
While teasing apart numeracy is appealing, the
current study did not measure numeracy. Similar to Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016), the
present study found that there was no gender
effect on CRT-2, inciting that CRT-2 seemed to
be more gender neutral than the original CRT.
Nonetheless, the gender effect on the original
CRT may have resulted from not only objective
numeracy (numerical skills) but also math anxiety, self-efficacy, and rational thinking (Primi,
Donati, Chiesi, & Morsanyi, 2018; Ring, Neyse,
David-Barett, & Schmidt, 2016; Sladek, Bond,
& Phillips, 2010; Zhang, Highhouse, & Rada,
2016). Thus, the present study simply replicated
the non-significant gender effect on CRT-2.
However, we believe such a pattern did not provide sufficient insight into the relationship between CRT-2 and numeracy. Hence, future studies are needed to clarify whether CRT-2 is less
affected by objective and/or subjective numeracy. Recently, a new version of CRT (termed
verbal CRT) based on non-mathematical problems was developed. This version has a weaker
relationship with numeracy and is more gender
neutral (Sirota, Kostovičová, Juanchich, Dewberry, & Marshall, 2018). We believe developing such a version is the right step to tease
apart cognitive reflection and numeracy.
The third limitation pertains to the study’s
external validity. The current study employed
college students from a participant pool. Although with such a sample, CRT-2 performed
well, we realize that further studies are needed
to examine whether CRT-2 can also be applied
to populations with different ages and education levels.
In sum, the present study reveals that with a
reliable intertemporal choice task, CRT-2’s correct response and intuitive errors are able to

predict choice preference in both gain and payment contexts. The study suggests that CRT-2
provides some more items for researchers to
select to characterize individual differences in
thinking style and judgment and decision making.
References
Baron, J., Scott, S., Fincher, K. S., & Metz, S. E. (2015).
Why does the Cognitive Reflection Test (sometimes)
predict utilitarian moral judgment (and other things)?
Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 4(3), 265–284. doi: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.
09.003
Bialek, M., & Pennycook, G. (2017). The Cognitive
Reflection Test is robust to multiple exposures. Behavior Research Methods, 50(5),1953–1959. doi:
10.3758/s13428-017-0963-x
Bialek, M., & Sawicki, P. (2018). Cognitive reflection
effects on time discounting. Journal of Individual
Differences, 39(2), 99–106. doi: 10.1027/16140001/a000254
Capraro, V., & Peltola, N. (2018). Lack of deliberation drives honesty among men but not women.
Retrieved
from
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182830. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3182830
Cheng, J., Lu, H., Han, X., González -Vallejo, C., & Sui,
N. (2012). Temporal discounting in heroin-dependent patients: No sign effect, weaker magnitude effect, and the relationship with inhibitory control.
Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology,
20(5), 400–409. doi: 10.1037/a0029657
Cheng, J., & González-Vallejo, C. (2016). Attributewise mechanism vs. alternative-wise mechanism in
intertemporal choice: Testing the proportional difference model, trade-off model and hyperbolic model.
Decision, 3(3), 190–215. doi: 10.1037/dec0000046
Cheng, J., & González-Vallejo, C. (2017). Action dynamics in intertemporal choice reveal different facets of psychological states. Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making, 30(1), 107–122. doi: 10.1002/
bdm.1923
Dai, J., & Busemeyer, J. R. (2014). A probabilistic,
dynamic, and attribute-wise model of intertemporal
choice. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143, 1489–1514. doi: 10.1037/a0035976
Dai, J., Pleskac, T. J., & Pachur, T. (2018). Dynamic
cognitive models of intertemporal choice. Cognitive Psychology, 104, 29–56. doi: 10.1016/
j.cogpsych.2018.03.001
de Wit, H. (2008). Impulsivity as a determinant and
consequence of drug use: A review of underlying pro-

Studia Psychologica, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2019, 86-98
cesses. Addiction Biology, 14, 22–31. doi: 10.1111/
j.1369-1600.2008.00129.x
Dshemuchadse, M., Scherbaum, S., & Goschke, T.
(2013). How decisions emerge: Action dynamics in
intertemporal decision making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142, 93–100. doi:
10.1037/a0028499
Estle, S. J., Green, L., Myerson, J., & Holt, D. D.
(2006). Differential effects of amount on temporal
and probability discounting of gains and losses.
Memory & Cognition, 34, 914–928. doi: 10.3758/
BF03193437
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of
reasoning, judgment and social cognition. Annual
Review of Psychology, 59, 255–278. doi: 10.1146/
annurev.psych.59.103006.093629
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reection and decision
making. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(4),
25–42. doi: 10.1257/089533005775196732
Haigh, M. (2016). Has the standard Cognitive Reflection Test become a victim of its own success? Advances in Cognitive Psychology, 12, 145–149. doi:
10.5709/acp-0193-5
Hoppe, E. I., & Kusterer, D. J. (2011). Behavioral biases
and cognitive reection. Economics Letters, 110(12),
97–100. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.015
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking fast and slow. New
York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux.
Kirby, K. N., Winston, G. C., & Santiesteban, M.
(2005). Impatience and grades: Delay-discount rates
correlate negatively with college GPA. Learning and
Individual Differences 15, 213–22. doi: 10.1016/
j.lindif.2005.01.003
Lee, I. A., & Preacher, K. J. (2013). Calculation for
the test of the difference between two dependent
correlations with one variable in common [Computer software]. Retrieved from http://quantpsy.org/
corrtest/corrtest2.htm
McClure, S. M., Laibson, D. I., Loewenstein, G., &
Cohen, J. D. (2004). Separate neural systems value
immediate and delayed monetary rewards. Science,
306(5695),
503–507.
doi:
10.1126/science.1100907
Meier, S., & Sprenger, C. D. (2012). Time discounting
predicts creditworthiness. Psychological Science,
23(1), 56–58. doi: 10.1177/0956797611425931
Meyer, A., Zhou, E., & Frederick, S. (2018). The noneffects of repeated exposure to the Cognitive Reflection Test. Judgment and Decision Making, 13,
2 4 6 – 2 5 9 . h ttp :/ /j ou rna l. sj dm.o rg/ 1 8 /1 8 2 2 8 a /
jdm18228a.html
Oechssler, J., Roider, A., & Schmitz, P. W. (2009).
Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 72(1), 147–
152. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.018

97

Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2018). Who falls for
fake news? The roles of bullshit receptivity,
overclaiming, familiarity, and analytic thinking.
Retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=3023545.
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3023545
Perry, J. L., & Carroll, M. E. (2008). The role of
impulsive behavior in drug abuse. Psychopharmacology (Berl), 200(1), 1–26. doi: 10.1007/s00213008-1 173-0
Peters, E., & Bjalkebring, P. (2015). Multiple numeric
competencies: When a number is not just a number.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
108(5), 802–22. doi: 10.1037/pspp0000019
Price, M., Higgs, S., Maw, J., & Lee, M. (2016). A dualprocess approach to exploring the role of delay discounting in obesity. Physiology & Behavior, 162,
46–51. doi: 10.1016/j.physbeh.2016.02.020
Primi, C., Morsanyi, K., Chiesi, F., Donati, M. A., &
Hamilton, J. (2016). The development and testing
of a new version of the Cognitive Reflection Test
applying item response theory (IRT). Journal of
Behavioral Decision Making, 29, 453–469. doi:
10.1002/bdm.1883
Primi, C., Donati, M., Chiesi, F., & Morsanyi,
K. (2018). Are there gender differences in cognitive reflection? Invariance and differences related
to mathematics. Thinking & Reasoning, 24(2), 258–
279. doi: 10.1080/13546783.2017.1387606
Reimers, S., Maylor, E. A., Stewart, N., & Chater, N.
(2009). Associations between a one-shot delay discounting measure and age, income education and
real-world impulsive behavior. Personality and Individual Differences, 47, 973–978. doi: 10.1016/
j.paid.2009.07.026
Reyna, V. F., Nelson, W. L., Han, P. K., & Dieckmann,
N. F. (2009). How numeracy influences risk comprehension and medical decision making. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 943–973. doi: 10.1037/
a0017327
Ring, P., Neyse, L., David-Barett, T., & Schmidt, U.
(2016). Gender differences in performance predictions: Evidence from the Cognitive Reflection
Test. Frontiers in Psychology, 7:1680. doi: 10.3389/
fpsyg.2016.01680
Schiff, S., Amodio, P., Testa, G., Nardi, M., Montagnese,
S., Caregaro, L., di Pellegrino, G., & Sellitto, M.
(2016). Impulsivity toward food reward is related to
BMI: Evidence from intertemporal choice in obese
and normal-weight individuals. Brain and Cognition, 110, 112–119. doi: 10.1016/j.bandc.2015.
10.001
Scholten, M., Read, D., & Sanborn, A. (2014). Weighing outcomes by time or against time? Evaluation
rules in intertemporal choice. Cognitive Science, 38,
399–438. doi: 10.1111/cogs.12104

98

Studia Psychologica, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2019, 86-98

Sinayev, A., & Peters, E. (2015). Cognitive reection
vs. calculation in decision making. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 532. doi: 10.1111/cogs.12104
Sirota, M., & Juanchich, M. (2018). Effect of response
format on cognitive reflection: Validating a twoand four-option multiple choice question version of
the cognitive reflection test. Behavior Research
Methods, 50(6), 2511–2522. doi: 10.3758/s13428018-1 029-4
Sirota, M., Kostovičová, L., Juanchich, M., Dewberry,
C., & Marshall, A. C. (2018). Measuring cognitive
reflection without maths: Developing and validating the verbal cognitive reflection test. PsyArXiv
Preprints. doi: 10.31234/osf.io/pfe79
Sladek, R. M., Bond, M. J., & Phillips, P. A. (2010).
Age and gender differences in preferences for rational and experiential thinking. Personality and Individual Differences, 49(8), 907–911. doi: 10.1016/
j.paid.2010.07.028
Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 119(1),
3–22. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.119.1.3
Šrol, J. (2018). These problems sound familiar to
me: Previous exposure, Cognitive Reflection Test,
and the moderating role of analytic thinking. Studia Psychologica, 60(3), 195–208. doi:
10.21909/sp.2018.03.762
Stagnaro, M. N., Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2018).
Performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test is

stable across time. Judgment and Decision Making,
13(3), 260–267. http://journal.sjdm.org/18/18201/
jdm18201.html
Stillman, P. E., Medvedev, D., & Ferguson, M. J. (2017).
Resisting temptation: Tracking how self-control
conflicts are successfully resolved in real time. Psychological Science, 28(9), 1240–1258. doi: 10.1177/
0956797617705386
Thomson, K. S., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2016). Investigating an alternate form of the Cognitive Reflection Test. Judgment and Decision Making, 11(1),
99–113.
http://journal.sjdm.org/15/151029/
jdm151029.html
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2014).
Assessing miserly information processing: An expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test. Thinking
& Reasoning, 20, 147–168. doi: 10.1080/
13546783.2013.844729
Yilmaz, O., & Saribay, S. A. (2017). The relationship
between cognitive style and political orientation
depends on the measures used. Judgment and Decision Making, 12(2), 140–147. http://journal.
sjdm.org/16/161128a/jdm161128a.html
Zhang, D. C., Highhouse, S., & Rada, T. B. (2016).
Explaining sex differences on the Cognitive Reflection Test. Personality and Individual Differences, 101, 425–427. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2016.
06.034

